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Abstract: It is a well-worn trope to view Plato’s banishment of the poets in 
Republic as a crude form of philistinism. In this paper I defend Plato against this 
charge. I argue that Republic does not present a final view of poetry, for it leaves 
room for a philosophical love of poetic beauty. First I analyse the political nature 
of Plato’s critique of poetry. I suggest that Plato does not reject the political order 
of change and decay, but opens space for a new kind of political project. I then 
suggest that Plato’s discussion of tragic poetry in Book X supports this claim, for 
it contains the hope for a reconfigured love of poetic beauty. I conclude that Plato 
does not limit aesthetic experience to artistic solace or metaphysical escapism, 
but opens a way to see aesthetic experience as a vital part of building a world in 
which it makes sense to live. 
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In Philosophy and Tragedy Walter Kaufmann claims that Plato’s infamous attack 
on the poets in Republic represents a desperate attempt to overcome life’s 
disappointments. While the disappointment Plato felt begins with politics – with the 
failure of politicians to avoid the fall of Athens during the Peloponnesian war, and 
with the trial and execution of his teacher, Socrates – Kaufmann argues Plato 
generalises from politics to the entire order of time and space. While the world 
promises us happiness, justice, and beauty, says Kaufmann’s Plato, it ‘does not keep 
its promises’.1 Even our experiences that seem to live up to our expectations turn out 
to be something else after a lapse of time. Kaufmann suggests that Plato identifies two 
enduring responses to the disparity between our expectations and our experience. The 
first is to accept the world as finite and imperfect and to seek comfort in art. This is 
the way of the poets. The second is to repudiate this world and to raise our thoughts to 
  
another realm, one void of time and change.2 For Kaufmann, Plato advocates the 
latter view, denigrating the poets as idolaters in order to construct a world devoid of 
change and decay that does deliver on its promises. 
Kaufmann’s interpretation of Republic bears close resemblance to Nietzsche’s 
characterisation of Plato as ‘the enemy’ of poetry in The Birth of Tragedy. For 
Nietzsche, Plato’s rejection of poetry marks an epochal moment; it is ‘the one turning 
point and vortex of so-called world history’ that led the ignorant herd away from the 
dangerous, thrilling truth of finitude to the safe, comforting, but ultimately false 
doctrine of transcendence.3 Plato’s banishment of the poets is an ‘escape’ from the 
hard facts of reality that the poets take as their building material. Prioritising the 
material over the ideal, Nietzsche does not present the destruction of Greece in terms 
of wars, decisions, and misjudgements, but in terms of philosophical justice meted on 
Plato’s metaphysical conservatism. 
What Kaufmann and Nietzsche share in common is that they both view Plato’s 
attack on poetry as a rejection of politics. In their reading of Republic, Plato rejects 
the city as the site of change and instead presents an otherworldly city so that the 
citizens might be educated to fit their predetermined place within it. Thus we must 
choose between one of two options: join Plato’s rejection of poetry for a higher, 
otherworldly reality, or limit our hopes to the fleeting moments of beauty we find in 
the arts. 
Several commentators have criticised this dichotomy by suggesting that Plato 
does not force us to choose between poetry and philosophy, for Plato’s aim is 
ultimately to bring them into closer proximity.4 Some do so by pointing out that Plato 
was clearly aware of the attack made centuries later by Nietzsche, for he notes that his 
contemporaries will find his argument ‘harsh’ and ‘boorish’ (607b). In response to 
such opponents who would reject his conception of philosophy to poetry, Plato claims 
that the quarrel between poetry and philosophy is ‘ancient’; that he is not responsible 
for the tensions between poetry and philosophy, for philosophers and poets have 
always been squabbling over the primacy of their arts. What is new about Plato’s 
approach, according to this view, is that instead of perpetuating the atrophy of poetry 
and philosophy, Plato works toward their convergence. In particular, he proposes a 
philosophical kind of poetry that might form the guardians as men of justice.  
While this view helpfully shows that Plato’s banishment of the poets is not his 
final word on the matter, it does not repudiate the attack made by Nietzsche and 
  
Kaufmann on Plato’s so-called otherworldly agenda. The convergence of poetry and 
philosophy in Plato’s philosophical kind of poetry is far from egalitarian, for poetry 
must answer to philosophy’s demands if it is to be admitted into the just city. Some 
scholars have noted the asymmetry of Plato’s view of poetry and philosophy, and yet 
argue Plato still holds poetry qua poetry in some esteem.5 Such scholars point to 
Plato’s self-confessed ‘love and reverence’ (596c) for Homer and the tragedians, and 
suggest that Plato does, despite himself, retain a desire that non-philosophical poetry 
might find a place in the just city. The upshot of this is that Plato does not force us to 
reject poetry for philosophy; rather, we might simply prioritise the one over the other. 
Again, this view does not refute the attack made by Nietzsche and Kaufmann, for 
despite Plato’s confessed love and reverence for Homer, poetry must still submit to 
the strictures of philosophy. Nietzsche’s political critique of Plato – that Plato’s 
rejection of poetry entails a rejection of the political sphere for the comfort of a polis 
that is not of this world – remains undefended. 
In this paper I aim to defend Plato against the critique of Nietzsche and 
Kaufmann by arguing that Plato does suggest an alternative to the dichotomy of 
poetry/philosophy in Republic, and not simply in the form of philosophical poetry. 
This alternative is not fully formed; rather, it is anticipated by the fact that Plato 
leaves room for a reconfigured eros of poetic beauty.6 The phrase ‘leaves room for’ is 
important: Plato banishes the poets in Book III, he decries the ontological status of 
poetry in comparison to philosophy, and he searches for a cure for the sickness with 
which poetry can infect the mind. However, by paying attention to Plato’s intentions 
in attacking the poets, and by noting his complex engagement with poetry in Book X, 
we find that Plato stops short of attacking poetry itself. I will suggest that Plato’s 
hesitancy can be explained through his concessions in Book X, which suggest he 
maintains a hope that our problematic love for poetry might be reconfigured through 
philosophy in such a way that is compatible with his project of reform. It is my aim to 
show that Plato’s hope is not without ground. 
By arguing that Plato leaves room for a reconfigured love of poetic beauty, I 
intend to show that Kaufmann and Nietzsche’s suggestion that Plato aims to escape 
from the disappointment of life does not do justice to Plato’s ambitions in Republic. 
Instead, I argue that Plato’s critique of poetry attempts to open space for a new kind 
of political project: the creation of a world in which it makes sense to live. In such a 
world it might be possible to love poetic beauty. This love, however, would be vastly 
  
different from the kind of love held by Plato’s contemporaries for the poetry of their 
day. 
To make this case I begin by examining the reason that Socrates and Glaucon 
decided that it would be beneficial to banish the poets in Books II and III of Republic. 
I claim that their proposal to banish the poets turns on the rejection of fate and the 
conviction that the citizens are the locus of civic change. I then turn to Plato’s direct 
critique of poetry in Book X, where I show that Plato’s argument is not directed 
against the poets, but against those who claim that the poets are wise in all matters. 
Bearing these first two points in mind – that Plato holds the citizens as the locus of 
change, and that he aims to undermine those who hold the poets as all-wise – I 
explore Plato’s provocative image of the ‘antidote’ to poetry’s seductive powers. 
When understood in light of these claims, Plato’s discussion of the antidote reveals 
his hope for a reconfigured love of poetic beauty that does not distort the soul but 
remains open to what is beyond the given. This reading of Republic navigates a path 
between the two options opened by Kaufmann’s reading of Plato; one that does not 
limit aesthetic experience to either artistic solace or metaphysical escapism, but that is 
part of the project of building a world in which it makes sense to live. 
1. Imitation and education 
 
There are two main ways that Plato’s story of education (mousike) in Republic 
can be taken, and both turn on how one understands the relation between poetry and 
politics. The first way, and the way put forward by Nietzsche, views Plato’s 
conception of politics as a form of escapism: Plato proposes to educate the citizens so 
that they might fit their predetermined place in the city.7 In this view, those who are 
most suited to education (the philosophers) concern themselves not with the city in 
itself, but that which is other than the city: the good and the just. Poetry must 
represent the triumph of the good so that the philosophers are not distracted by this 
world but are formed according to otherworldly matters. The second way is that 
Plato’s view of education is ‘political’ in the modern sense of the word: Plato’s view 
of education entails that civic cultivation can remake this present world (i.e. the city) 
in a better way, and that a properly philosophical love of poetry can play a role in this 
cultivation.8 
  
In this section I focus on the role of poetry in Plato’s view of civic education in 
order to argue that the second reading of Republic does greater justice to Plato’s 
argument than the first. Socrates does not direct his attention in Books II and III to 
poetry itself, but – as Kaufmann rightly notes – to the demise of the Athenian public 
sphere. Yet rather than following Kaufmann by concluding that Socrates responds to 
this demise by seeking comfort in a world beyond decay, I suggest that Plato’s 
critique of Athenian education is based on the conviction that it is neither fate nor the 
gods that shape civic life, but the citizens. The emphasis Plato places on the agency of 
the citizens, I suggest, entails that his view of education, and thus poetry, is concerned 
with matters of this world rather than one that lies beyond it. 
To begin, the context in which Plato writes Republic gives us reason to consider 
his examination of the poets as an outworking of his conviction that it is the citizens 
who shape the city. As Danielle Allen notes, Plato’s motivation for writing must be 
understood in the context of his own formation.9 We do well to remember that Plato 
was educated during the tumultuous years of the Peloponnesian war that saw the so-
called Golden Age of Athens come to a dramatic end. During the Golden Age, the 
city’s economic, military, and political life flourished as Homer and the tragedians 
were held as rich sources of public wisdom. Yet this period of Athenian history lasted 
less than a century; the final years of the Peloponnesian war saw Athens brought to its 
knees: the Athenian naval fleets were defeated, the city became subject to Sparta, and 
Athens lost its standing as the preeminent Greek city-state. Yet despite the demise of 
Athens, it seems that many citizens continued to honour the heroes of the Golden Age 
– such as Aeschylus, Pericles, Cleon, and Sophocles – for their wisdom in matters of 
civic life.10 Yet for Plato, the so-called wisdom of these heroes informed decisions 
that led to the decline of Athens. In the Gorgias he argues that if the heroes were as 
just and intelligent as people claim, then they would have raised their own sons in a 
corresponding fashion.11 The corruption of Athens, he suggests, gives testament to the 
inability of the past generation to educate their youth in such a way that would 
empower them to make decisions that would ensure the flourishing of the city. For 
this reason he argues that those ‘who praise Homer and claim that this poet has 
educated Greece’, who believe that Homer ‘deserves to be taken up and studied both 
for the conduct of human affairs and for education (mousike)’, must be called into 
question (606e). 
  
Plato’s critique of Athenian education shares one assumption with the politicians 
of the Golden Age: like Pericles and Cleon, Plato attributes a primary role to the 
citizens in historical change. By attacking the poverty of Athenian education, Plato 
implies that the demise of Athens was not fated by unknowable forces beyond human 
control, and neither does it express the deep disappointment that permeates all human 
life under the sun. Rather, Plato presents the demise of Athens as the result of 
ignorance in matters of education. From this conviction he begins his story of the 
ideal city with a reassessment of mousike, that is, of the strategies that the Athenians 
employed in the education of its citizens.12 Education is the fundamental place to 
begin civic reform, for ‘the beliefs [that the young] absorb at that age are difficult to 
erase and tend to become unalterable’ (378d-e). Due to the indelible nature of 
education, Plato states to Glaucon that we must ‘take the utmost care to ensure that 
the first stories they hear about virtue are the best ones for them to hear’.  
Plato clearly thinks that those who depend on Homer’s poetry for the basic 
formative stories are misguided. He argues that to assume that poets have knowledge 
of things they represent, and are thus helpful for the process of education, is to 
mistake the kind of craft that poets possess. To make this case, he introduces the 
concept of mimesis, or imitation, in order to problematise the idea that poets are 
skilled in the crafts they represent. Rather than being skilled in such crafts, Plato aims 
to show that the poets are skilled in a second-order craft: the craft of imitating. In 
Plato’s view, the writing of poetry occurs in a sequence of transitions: in representing 
a particular character the poet imagines himself being the character he imitates, 
transmitting this psychological condition to the performers and onto the audience. For 
example, Plato describes Homer’s speaking ‘as if he were’ Chryses as mimesis, for it 
is a kind of ‘likening oneself to someone else, either in voice or shape’ (393c). 
Homer’s activity is intentionally like another activity, namely, Chryses’ speech. 
Plato’s charge is that Homer tries as much as possible to make it seem to us that it is 
not he who speaks, ‘but that it is the old priest’ (393a-b). He does not describe 
Homer’s intentions as ‘deceiving’, as if his intentions were malicious, but as 
‘seeming’; Homer makes it seem as if he were Chryses despite the fact that the 
audience know that he is not. What else would a poet try to do? While this process of 
seeming is not harmful in itself, when the audience accept this seeming for reality, 
harm can occur. One might say that Plato was aware of the wilful suspension of 
disbelief a few millennia before Coleridge: he recognises that while the audience are 
  
aware that Homer is not Chryses, they (willingly) forget this, for they allow 
themselves to be carried away by Homer’s skill of imitation. This, for Plato, is 
precisely how people come to believe that Homer deserves to be studied both for the 
conduct of human affairs and for education; they mistake his skill in imitating human 
affairs with the skill of doing them. 
Having established that the skill of the poets is the skill of imitation (to represent 
the likeness of a character or human affairs), Socrates asks Glaucon whether ‘we want 
our guardians to be good at imitation’ (394e). It is not clear how this question stems 
from his prior critique of poetic mimesis unless we recognise that he introduces a 
second kind of mimesis that is not limited to the production of art, but concerns the 
performance of the art by a poet’s student. Plato seeks to establish that the guardians 
should never imitate a disgraceful part on the stage for fear of catching ‘the infection’ 
in real life: 
 
For have you not noticed how dramatic and similar representations, if 
indulgence in them is prolonged into adult life, establish habits of physical 
poise, intonation and thought which become second nature? (395c-d) 
 
The kind of imitation Plato discusses here involves the impersonation of the activity 
of another person: a ‘dramatic’ representation. Opposed to Homer’s productive 
mimesis, this is a non-productive kind of mimesis, for the end result is not the creation 
of a piece of poetry but the likening of oneself to another through embodied mime. 
Yet according to Plato, non-productive mimesis does not only affect the body and 
practices of speech; it also affects the mind. Because acting and embodiment were 
central components of traditional mousike, Socrates makes it clear that the guardians 
are not to imitate Homeric tragedy, for it does not shape their characters in terms of 
virtue.13 They must be able to ‘recognize madness and wickedness’, Plato states, but 
must not ‘do these things or imitate them’ (396a). Thus Plato does not argue that the 
guardians ought to be protected from disgraceful characters, but that they ought not 
imitate them. 
Plato does not introduce the concept of mimesis to make attack the medium of 
poetry, but to examine the maker of poetry: the one who imitates all crafts 
(mimetikoi). It is in this context that Plato uses the infamous language of 
‘banishment’. Yet it is not poetry that is banished, but 
 
  
the one who can take on every kind of shape. He, not god, is the one who 
would use his powers of enchantment to make us think that he has become all 
sorts of persons – human and divine. (398a) 
 
Socrates’ tone in this passage is highly satirical. At first he seems quite positive 
toward the poets. If such a poet arrived in the city who by ‘showing off’ his poems 
could convince us that he is ‘all things’, Socrates suggests that we (Socrates, Glaucon, 
and ‘we’ the reader) ought to anoint his head with myrrh and crown him with wool. 
However, once we have crowned the poet in a fitting way, Socrates states that we 
ought not keep him but politely banish or, to use R. E. Allen’s translation, ‘send him 
on’, to another city.14 While such a poet is certainly impressive, he would not interest 
us, says Socrates: ‘we would employ for our benefit more austere and less charming 
poets’ (389b). Such poets would ‘imitate for us the diction of people of good 
character’, for such models would contribute toward the proper education of the 
guardians. 
Socrates’ conversation with Glaucon regarding the itinerant poet is playful, and 
requires careful consideration if we are to infer from it ‘Plato’s view of poetry’. 
However, it is not difficult to infer the major claim that Plato is driving home in this 
episode: that itinerant poets tend to deceive their audience into believing that they are 
skilled in all that they represent. Socrates does not show any anger or impatience with 
the poets. He simply suggests that the citizens of a just city would recognise the 
poet’s skill without being overwhelmed, enjoy his work, crown him with wool, and 
then move him along, for they would not be interested in someone who is skilled only 
in imitation. 
Clearly Socrates is not criticising the medium of poetry but a particular 
manifestation of its maker. Imitation can play a properly educative role – indeed, it 
must – but poetry, as a form of imitation, does not currently play that role, because it 
is not conscious of its status as imitation. Poets need not be expelled, Socrates notes, 
if they were to ‘imitate the style of the good man and in their works abide by the 
principles we laid down for them when we started out on this attempt to educate the 
guardians’ (398b). Thus his banishment of the poets is not a final verdict on poetry (at 
least in Book III), for the poetic style could very well be put to good use. Yet given 
the present ignorance of the citizens, Socrates proposes to banish mimetikoi so that 
this ignorance can be addressed though a properly educative form of mousike. Once 
civic education has been remedied and the people come to recognise the ignorance of 
  
the poets in the matters they represent, it seems that Socrates is open to reconsider the 
merit of those who are skilled in imitation once more (see 607e-608b). 
Before I move to Plato’s concession to reconsider poetry, it is important to return 
to the context of Republic in order to note that Socrates’ scrutiny of the poets is part 
of Plato’s larger search for reform. Here it is particularly evident that Kaufmann’s 
existential interpretation of Plato is misleading. In Plato’s understanding, the demise 
of Athenian society does not entail that the world is determined by fate; that we live 
under the rule of an unpredictable tyrant-god who distributes a random assortment of 
good and evil. Plato is critical of the view of fate presented by Homer in the Iliad, 
which entails that ‘Zeus has two jars standing on the floor of his palace, full of fates, 
good in one and evil in the other’ (379d). For Plato, to ‘seek comfort in art and 
poetry’, as he does in Kaufmann’s reading, would be to accept Homeric fate and 
concede that, despite our inner conviction that things are not what they could be, what 
is is divinely given. In other words, Homer’s view of fate undermines the ability of 
the citizens to shape what is held in common. Nietzsche accepts this view of fate in 
Birth of Tragedy, and argues that it is necessary if we are to cope with life’s 
disappointments through aesthetic solace.15 For Plato, the kind of poetry that 
represents the way the world appears to us now can tell us nothing of how it could be 
or how we should act. Thus, while the skilful representation of the world might be 
pleasurable, it cannot direct us beyond the given order. Such a task requires another 
kind of representation that does not imitate appearances but opens us to what might 
lie beyond them. 
When we recognise Plato’s attempt to reform the city, it is clear that mimesis 
itself is not to be banned. Indeed, he never ceases to think that mimesis is the first step 
in a child’s habituation into a particular character-type (see 403c, 410a, 424b-d, 429e-
430b, 522a). Yet Socrates is quick to assert that the guardians must only imitate 
characters suitable to their craft: men of courage, self-control, piety, freedom of spirit, 
and similar qualities (395d). Here we find a call for the reformed kind of poetry that 
will serve the city; a philosophical kind of poetry that imitates the truth. 
2. Imitation and poetry 
 
While Plato argues in Books II and III of Republic that one ‘who can take on 
every kind of shape’ should be banished, he identifies a way that poetry could assist 
  
in the formation of the guardians. Yet in Book X Socrates and Glaucon turn their gaze 
to poetry itself in order to refute the claim that the poets are all-knowing. For 
Kaufmann, Plato’s attack on poetry in Book X does not only reiterate the banishment 
he declared in Book III; more seriously, it extends his critique of the corruption from 
the effects of poetry to poetry’s essence.16 According to Kaufmann, in Book X Plato 
argues that poets and artists ‘lure us to move in the wrong direction – not from what 
seems to what really is, but from treacherous semblances … to the images of the 
deceitful, ever-changing, fickle world’. Kaufmann implies that Plato’s banishment of 
mimetikoi in Book III is paradigmatic for the makers of all the arts, which Plato 
makes clear in Book X through his final critique of poetry. 
In the following section I will argue that in the midst of his critique of poetry in 
Book X, Plato leaves room for tragic poetry despite the fact that he struggles to 
formulate an argument for tragic poetry’s continued existence in the city. Yet before 
making this claim it is important to clear the ground by showing that Plato’s critique 
in Book X is not primarily directed at poetry, as Kaufmann claims, but at the 
reception of poetry. Plato’s intention is not to banish tragic poetry once and for all, 
but to show that it is wrongheaded to consider the poets wise in such matters of 
education, government, generalship, or any other human activity. Plato’s argument 
does not conclude that poetry is useless, but that, in the context of Athenian decline, 
its use remains to be seen. 
From the outset of Book X, Plato’s opponent is no longer the poets but those who 
hold the poets to be knowledgeable: 
 
We hear from some people that the tragic poets know all arts, all things human 
relative to virtue and vice, and divine things too; because the good poet 
necessarily, if he is going to deal well with the subjects with which he deals, 
must therefore have knowledge or he couldn’t do it. (598e-599a)17  
 
For Plato, the view held by ‘those who say that tragic poets know all arts’ is based on 
the following argument: 
 
P1. If the poets ‘deal well’ with X then they have knowledge of X 
P2. The poets deal well with X 
C. Therefore the poets have knowledge of X 
 
Plato’s aim is to show that this argument holds only for those who have been 
‘deceived’ by these ‘imitators’ (599a). Yet he does not suggest that the responsibility 
  
for this deception lies in the hands of the imitators; that poetry is to be blamed for the 
ignorance of the people. Rather, the one who is deceived is deceived because of ‘his 
own inability to distinguish between knowledge, lack of knowledge, and imitation’ 
(598d). Plato attacks this argument in order to show that the responsibility for the 
disordered state of Athens lies in the people. 
To establish that those who hold the above argument are deceived, Plato responds 
through a reductio, beginning from the assumption that it is absurd to conclude that a 
poet has knowledge of a craft, such as shipbuilding, when he or she has never built a 
ship or been trained in the art of shipbuilding. If the poets do not have knowledge, 
that is, if C is false, then it follows that either P1 or P2 must be false: either the poets 
do not deal well with X (P2), or the conditional (P1) is flawed. Plato is the first to 
admit that P2 is true; the poets deal well with their objects of representation, for they 
are masters of mimesis. Thus P1 must be false; Plato’s argument ultimately serves to 
break the if-then connection between dealing well and knowing. 
Socrates provides two arguments against the poets in order to establish that while 
they might deal well with the things they represent, they do not necessarily have 
knowledge of them. First, he argues that the knowledge that the poets would have to 
possess in order to be competent in all the matters they speak about is simply too vast, 
for it comprises numerous arts about which other people only have limited knowledge 
(598c-d). Socrates gives little evidence to support this argument; he simply assumes 
that one can be proficient in only one art, for proficiency takes singular dedication. 
Second, Socrates presents an argument ad hominum: while Homer and other poets 
speak of matters related to these various arts, they have not proved their competence 
by doing them. Homer has never cured anyone, so his narration of Hekamede’s 
preparing of an antidote to heal the wounds of Machaon cannot be considered 
authoritative (598c-d). Moreover, Homer was never asked to be involved in 
statesmanship and neither has he proved himself as a general, so we cannot confer 
that he had any knowledge of such arts (600a). These two arguments attack the 
conditional in P1 to show that knowledge is not a necessary condition of dealing well 
with what is represented. In contrast, Socrates formulates an alternative conditional: if 
one can deal well with a particular craft, then one possesses the skill of imitation. 
Having challenged the connection between dealing well and knowing through 
these two arguments, Socrates then gives account of why so many people seem to find 
it convincing. The error made by those who hold P1, Socrates states, is to ‘judge only 
  
from words’. Judging only from words is wrongheaded, for a poet uses the right 
words from a certain craft 
 
without understanding anything except how to imitate, so that he seems to 
speak very well to others of the same sort, who judge only from his words, 
whether he is talking about shoemaking or generalship or anything else 
whatever. So great is the charm that metre, mode and rhythm naturally 
possess. (601a-601b) 
 
The charm of poetry’s stylistic elements hides the fact that the poet knows nothing of 
the craft they represent. By employing poetic techniques – by speaking well – the 
poets appear to possess knowledge of the crafts they represent only to those who 
judge by words alone. Socrates clearly believes that he can discern this difference, for 
he knows that speaking well only entails the skill of imitation rather than the skill 
itself. In other words, Socrates looks beyond the spoken words of the poets for 
evidence of their competence, and yet finds nothing. 
Plato develops the notion of mimesis in Book X beyond that which we saw in 
Books II and III in order to give the reader a deeper grasp of how art is deceptive. He 
no longer considers the non-productive notion of mimesis (enactment), but focuses 
entirely on the productive form that occurs when a poet produces a representation of a 
person or human affairs. Yet productive mimesis does not only characterise the poets; 
Plato extends his analysis of productive mimesis to the representative arts in general 
in order to show that one can represent a craft well without having knowledge of that 
craft. Indeed, Socrates seems less concerned with the poets than he is with mimetikoi. 
Here he describes a mimetikoi as ‘a craftsman of images’ (599d), a person who walks 
around with a mirror, passively reflecting the surfaces of the world as they appear, but 
‘surely not in truth’ (596d-e). While the image of the mirror-holder seems to relate 
more to painting than to poetry, Plato is convinced that the nature of poetry is 
analogous to painting; in the same way that painting gives an image of, say, a 
landscape, poetry imitates what characters and human affairs look like. This analogy 
between poetry and painting leads to Plato’s tripartite ontology: (1) God makes the 
idea, such as the ideal table, (2) the craftsman ‘looks to the idea’ (596b), bringing the 
table into being in the world of appearance, and (3) the artist copies what the 
craftsman has made, wither through producing an image (painting), through verse 
(poetry), or though some other medium. The painter and poet are ontologically the 
same: both make a copy of a copy, and know nothing of the idea itself. Thus 
  
 
The practice of mimesis is then far from what is true and, as it seems, 
fabricates everything because of this: because it captures something little of 
each thing, and this is an image. (598b) 
 
While the craftsman practices a kind of mimesis, for he fabricates by copying an idea, 
he is different from a poet for his craft cannot be defined in terms of imitation. 
Rather, his craft operates in a fashion that constructs with the ideal in view; he 
produces through knowledge.18 The one who possess only the craft of imitation, 
however, knows ‘little or nothing about the subjects he imitates’ (603b). Thus ‘the art 
of mimesis is something that has no serious value; and … this applies above all to all 
tragic poetry, epic or dramatic’. In comparison to the art of the craftsman, the art of 
imitation has no serious value, for while both are a form of imitation, the craftsman 
imitates something substantial. From this metaphysical framework he can argue that 
‘when someone reports to us that he has met a man who has knowledge of all the arts 
and everything else’, we do not need to test his claim empirically; we can assume that 
he has ‘been deceived by an imitator’ (598e). However, while Plato depicts the hold 
of the poetic arts over the people as ‘deception’ and ‘sorcery’ (598d), it is clear that he 
does not think that the responsibility for the ensnarement lies with the imitator. 
Instead, responsibility lies with the one who was deceived/charmed, for such a person 
is responsible for his or her own ignorance. Ensnarement is only possible if one is 
unable to ‘discriminate between knowledge, ignorance, and imitation’. 
Plato does not think that poetry is neutral, for its poetic elements have the 
enticing ability to charm and ensnare us. However, he does not object to poetry on 
this ground. Rather, he objects to the situation in which the spectators are misled 
because they remain ignorant of the poets’ true skill, and thus become deceived that 
the poets have knowledge in matters of life. This distinction is important for Plato’s 
argument, for, at least in Book X, he is not attacking the poets as much as those who 
hold that Homer is the all-wise educator. He even defends Homer’s poetry by 
acknowledging that Homer never claimed to possess any knowledge about the things 
he represented.19 Such an error was made only by his followers who believed him to 
be all-wise (599e-600a). The charm that metre, mode, and rhythm naturally possess, 
the enchanting way that the audience is fooled into judging only his words and not his 
actions, and the poet’s profound skill in reproducing images, all serve to fool the 
spectators into believing that the poet has knowledge of what he represents. The 
  
spectators who are unable to discern the difference between knowledge and imitation 
lack an ‘antidote’ (595b), Plato states, that is able to protect them from the danger of 
poetry. They lack a counter-spell that could allow them to experience poetic beauty 
without being corrupted. Precisely what this antidote might entail, and what it shows 
about Plato’s view of art, remains to be seen. 
3. The antidote 
 
Plato’s argument aims to show that those who consider the poets to have 
knowledge of the things they represent are deceived. Yet he does not suggest that the 
poets are wholly responsible for the ignorance of the people, for his argument is 
ultimately directed at the people who hold this view. Yet if the people are responsible 
for their own deception, and yet remain in the state of deception, how can they escape 
this vicious cycle? Presumably Plato’s alternative kind of poetry – poetry that is used 
with knowledge – is part of his solution. The presentation of Kallipolis through 
Plato’s writing might constitute one such form of mimesis. For Nietzsche, of course, 
this kind of art is deeply problematic, for it embodies philosophy’s preoccupation 
with the otherworldly. Yet it is also problematic on the terms of Plato’s project, as I 
have outlined it, for Plato’s idea of philosophical poetry only provides a solution for 
the guardians, that is, those who have been taken from their families at birth, 
subjected to rigorous mathematical training, and shaped through philosophical 
mousike. These guardians exist only in the presentation of Kallipolis in Republic, and 
it is not to them that Plato writes. If Plato desires to alter the present conditions of 
Athens – including those like himself who were formed by Homer and the tragic 
poets – how might poetry play a role? 
In this section I aim to show that while Nietzsche’s concern for Plato’s 
philosophical poetry might be valid, Plato does not only admit philosophical poetry 
into the city, but also leaves room for a reconfigured love of poetic beauty; what I will 
call a philosophical love of poetry. I am not suggesting that Plato’s view of poetry is 
actually in line with Nietzsche’s project. Rather, I aim to show that Nietzsche’s 
caricature of Plato’s political project as escapist is ultimately flawed. Despite Plato’s 
weaknesses, I claim that his approach to political reform seeks to embrace this world 
more fully than Nietzsche’s aestheticism, for it problematises the given in a way that 
does not seek ecstatic moments of aesthetic reprieve, but invites the Athenian people 
  
to take hold of the trajectory of their city. Plato’s discussion of poetry in Book X 
reveals that he maintains hope that tragic poetry could be a valuable part of a city that 
does not accept the given but aspires to what is ungiven. 
From the very outset of Book X Plato explores our relation to poetry in terms of 
love. In the opening lines, Socrates announces that he is returning to his refusal in 
Book III to admit poetry that is ‘merely imitative’ (595a). He does not refer to his 
earlier argument as a refusal of imitative poetry as such, but a refusal of poetry that is 
merely imitative; poetry that imitates in abstraction from the idea. He then utters a 
provocative summary of his reasons for refusing such poetry: ‘Everything of this sort 
seems to be a corruption of understanding for hearers who do not have, as an antidote, 
knowledge of what things happen to be in themselves’ (595b, my emphasis).  
To explain what he means an antidote, Socrates draws it into an analogy with the 
youthful experience of falling in love. First, he examines the seductive call of his own 
first romance, and identifies two opposed desires in this experience that structure his 
treatment of poetry. The first desire comes from memory; when Socrates recalls his 
first love, he is enticed to return to its pleasures that still lay claim to his aging 
affections. The second desire comes from reason; many who fall in love recognise, 
despite their passion, that the object of their love may not actually be beneficial. 
Against their emotions, such people must wilfully stay away from the object of their 
love in order to prioritise a desire they deem to be more significant. In other words, 
they must transform their relation to the object of their love through another love. 
Socrates clearly has in mind his own love of poetry, which, like a youthful lover 
who refuses to be forgotten, continues to beckon his attention. He acknowledges his 
youthful love of poetry, yet recognises that there came a time that he had to cleave 
from the allure of poetic beauty in order to learn of higher things. This decision, 
however, was not based on the knowledge that poetry is useless, just as the man who 
rejects his lover does not know that she is ultimately bad for him. Rather, it is based 
on the fact that its use remains to be established; his enraptured state quells all rational 
consideration. It is Socrates’ desire to know that he is investing in something useful 
that turns him to a medium that is able to defend itself, namely, philosophy. Yet 
despite turning away from the youthful romance and toward philosophy, Socrates 
admits that he would like poetry to be proven to be an object worthy of his love, just 
as any man would like his love to be proved beneficial to his life. Yet to listen to 
poetry without discerning whether it is truly worthy of his affections would prove too 
  
strong; the allure of metre and verse would surely conquer his heart while its 
worthiness remains to be seen. 
While this settlement seems to be self-defeating – Socrates precludes the audition 
of poetry on the grounds that its worth is unknown, yet without auditing poetry one 
cannot make an assessment of poetry’s worth – he then concedes that he will, despite 
his better judgment, listen to poetry once more. This audition will not be unmediated, 
however, for he will be sure to ‘chant’ to himself a ‘counter-charm’ in order to 
prevent himself ‘from slipping back into the childish passion that the masses have’ 
(608a). This counter-charm is none other than the argument of Book X: the case that 
poetry is not ‘a serious undertaking that grasps truth’, but a form of mimesis. By 
describing his argument as a counter-charm (presumably another way of talking about 
the antidote), Socrates shows again that his main concern is for those who accept the 
conditional in P1, that is, those who are not able to discern the kind of knowledge 
possessed by the poets. As I argued in section one, Plato wants to exclude poetry that 
is not philosophical in order to guarantee that the guardians of Kallipolis are formed 
according to the good. Here, however, it seems that Plato is no longer exploring the 
appropriate formation of the guardians, but how the present citizens of Athens, 
including himself, might relate to poetry. If the Athenian citizens could become 
equipped with knowledge – if they could learn what poetry amounts to – then they 
would be armed with a kind of protection from the corruptive influence of ‘merely 
imitative’ poetry. Then they could enjoy the pleasures of poetic beauty whilst 
recognising that what the mirror beholds is not all that there is. 
While Plato’s antidote to poetry’s sway might at first appear to be in tension with 
his earlier banishment of the poets, it is not inconsistent with his overall argument. 
While he loves the beauty he encounters in Homer’s representation of the tragic 
world, Plato remains concerned for those who are unable to discern that Homer’s 
presentation does not amount to knowledge. He concedes that, like Nietzsche, he 
enjoys the lamentations of tragic poetry and the pleasure of giving himself over to it 
(605d).20 Yet unlike Nietzsche, he refuses to accept that lamentation plumbs deeper 
into reality than knowledge; one would first have to consider which medium is more 
proficient at presenting the truth if one was to make such a claim. In other words, one 
would first have to practice philosophy. Plato’s idea of a philosophical love of poetry 
is consistent with his overall argument if we accept that the philosophical nature of 
the love – the knowledge that what is presented through poetry is not necessarily true 
  
– provides an antidote to the dangerous elements of the allure of poetic beauty. Plato’s 
pharmacological imagery implies that he figures tragic poetry as a kind of beautiful 
poison, pleasurable in its depiction of the world of appearances but deathly in its 
potential to occlude our insight into the good. Thus he argues that a philosophical love 
of poetry (not simply a love of philosophical poetry) might afford enough protection 
so that we might experience poetic beauty without being overcome by its spell. 
4. A philosophical love of poetry 
 
While Plato’s position seems to oscillate between expelling and conceding, 
calling for philosophical poetry and advocating an antidote that could allow us to 
continue enjoying tragic poetry, it presses toward a single end: elucidating the nature 
of mimesis. If we are to challenge the fatedness of the apparent order of things, if we 
are to cleave open the possibility of something more than what is, then we require 
other modes of mimesis that are able to open a space in which to discover the efficacy 
of human action in altering the given world. Republic must be seen as one such 
attempt; Socrates’ discussion of Kallipolis imitates the just city in order to transform 
the reader’s relation to the present city. It is certainly a flawed attempt, for by limiting 
mimesis to a passive kind of mirroring, Plato restricts poetic presentation from 
extending beyond what is given. Indeed, Plato’s Republic itself is creative in a non-
mimetic sense, for it breaks with previous modes of presentation in the attempt to 
open a world that lies beyond the present. 
Understanding Republic as an attempt to alter the relation of the citizens to the 
city entails that Nietzsche and Kaufmann’s portrayal of Plato’s view on poetry as the 
desire to escape the fragmented world of appearances for a perfect order of harmony 
is problematic on two fronts. First, it fails to call into question those who Plato aims 
to critique in Republic: those who hold that Homer is all-knowing. Neither Nietzsche 
nor Kaufmann would have much time for those who turn to art for knowledge in 
matters of education. Second, it fails to properly understand the political dimension of 
Plato’s project: Plato aims to alter the relation of the people to the poetic arts through 
philosophy in order to open what lies beyond the given. In this sense, while Plato, 
Nietzsche, and Kaufmann all attempt to challenge their readers to take this world 
more seriously, Plato’s attempt to reform civic education takes us further than the 
proposal put forward by Nietzsche and Kaufmann. Artistic solace is not an end, for 
  
Plato, and neither can its value be found until one thinks philosophically. To accept 
the pleasures of art as the highest reality is to accept the given order as fate. 
Alternatively, Socrates argues that the pleasures of art must be subsidiary to a greater 
task of building a political order in which it makes sense to live. Only a philosophical 
love of poetic beauty would allow the Athenian people to experience the pleasures of 
poetry without accepting the given world as final. 
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